[FM23] CÉSAR LUIS MENOTTI -TACTICAL MASTER

7 min readJan 13, 2023

And to those who say that all that matters is winning, I want to warn them that someone always wins. Therefore, in a thirty-team championship, there are twenty-nine who must ask themselves: what did I leave at this club, what did I bring to my players, what possibility of growth did I give to my footballers?

It was the above quote from César Luis Menotti which sparked my interest in building the game model for my save with sc Heerenveen around the tactical ideology of the Argentinian. The synergy between Menotti’s desire to have a positive impact on the club and players fits like a glove with the De Superfriezen strategy which was covered in my opening post Frisian Football Philosophy.

Menotti, born in Rosario became the first man to deliver the World Cup to La Albiceleste and he did it playing attractive, attacking football.

Menotti was an ineffably romantic figure. A pencil-thin chain-smoker with collar-length hair, greying sideburns and the stare of an eagle, he seemed the embodiment of Argentinian bohemianism.

He would never sacrifice style in order to achieve results. “You can lose a game,” he argued, “but what you cannot lose is the dignity earned by playing good football”.

THE SHAPE

The 4–3–3 is a formation that uses four defenders — made up of two centre-backs and two full-backs — behind a midfield line of three. The most common set-up in midfield is one deeper player — the single pivot — and two slightly more advanced to either side. The front line is then composed of two wide attackers who play on either side of a single centre-forward.

The traditional Argentine tactic was to have two defensive-minded midfielders as part of a three-man midfield. The number 5 would be the central one of the three and would primarily sit with the ability to dictate play. He would be the one to set the tempo, recycle possession, take the ball off the back line to start the attacks, and be the one that the defence use to set their starting position from, this was played by Américo Rubén Gallego.

The role is an integral part of the Argentina system and one which I will be looking to focus a lot of my attention on through both tactical and data analysis. Beside him you would usually have the roaming destroyer, capable of going box-to-box trying to win back possession. This role was changed to encompass the talent of Osvaldo Ardiles, the engine in that selection. A player who would often play from area to area, paired with his ability to link defence to attack made him a fundamental piece for Menotti.

The third man in this midfield trio (Mario Kempes) was the figure of the World Cup, the scorer and one of the players who best attacked the free spaces near the rival area.

The pass became the great ally of the Argentine national team, this should come as no surprise as the 4–3–3 creates natural triangles, often giving the player in possession several passing options at any given time. This makes implementing a possession-based style of play slightly easier than some other formations.

However, this possession game was not the brand of football which you and I may associate with the modern game, Menotti’s brand was fuelled with ‘La Nuestra’, as informed by fellow FM’er Rock’s End FM.

What is La Nuestra?

The development of La Nuestra, ‘our style of play’, in Argentina stemmed from the slum housing of Buenos Aires during the 1920s. There, poor workers lived cheek by jowl, meaning that space in which one could play football was at a premium. The result was a game where possession became central. Dribbling and ball retention became the most prized assets of La Nuestra. This individuality, creativity and expressive attacking play became the fundamental facets of a style that rapidly began to dominate the soccer world.

This was applied in FM by simply activating the ‘Run at Defence’ team instruction which simply allows the players to run at the opposition more than the tactic allows by default.

OUT OF POSSESSION RESPONSIBILITIES

The fundamental principle of Menotti’s style of play when he lost the ball was the reduction of space to the rival, what in Argentina they call “the bilge”. This was based on the constant use of the offside rule (Much Higher Defensive Line) and using high pressure after losing the ball (High Press and Much More Option), something that, executed correctly, limited the opponent’s offensive possibilities.

Shrinking spaces forward brought with it the increase of ground in behind the defensive line. However, Passarella was effective at stopping the opposition at source, his ability to react quickly and prevent the play advancing to the creative phase was exceptional. His ability to engage with the opponents slowed their advance from continuing, enabling his teammates to reorganise defensively.

In order to replicate this is FM, I opted to have the centre-back pairing of a ‘Stopper’ and ‘Cover’. The ‘Stopper’ will push ahead of the defensive line and close down players before they get into the area. Whilst the ‘Cover’ will drop a little deeper and sweep up through balls behind the defensive line.

IN POSSESSION RESPONSIBILITIES

Menotti’s Argentina was a team that wanted the ball and for this it demanded that its players play in a leisurely manner, avoiding defence-attack transitions except on specific occasions, hence the application of ‘Lower Tempo’.

Another fundamental aspect of Menotti’s team was the role of Kempes. The 10 was a footballer who often ghosted into the oppositions area, arriving late with devastating effect.

In addition, he was able to change his position and play close to the left wing. He developed a partnership with Luque that allowed him to take advantage of the spaces left free by the defenders who followed the striker when he left his position.

STRENGTHS

The three-player midfield unit can create overloads in central areas, which will further help attempts to dominate possession. A dropping centre-forward or inverted full-back can add another body in midfield. This can help retain a central overload, should the opposition also set up with three central midfielders.

The formation also makes it easy for lots of players to move forward and attack. Many teams playing in a 4–3–3 will end up with a front line of five, with the centre-forward and wingers accompanied by the full-backs or attacking midfielders.

The 4–3–3 is also a good formation from which to press. A three-man forward line provides good numbers to apply pressure on the opposition defence. The midfield three then provides cover and protection in central areas. This is useful both when pressing high or converting into a more reserved block.

WEAKNESSES

The space left in the wide areas between the full-back and winger in a 4–3–3 can be exposed and targeted by the opposition. This is usually via quick counter-attacks and swift, direct switches of play.

With this formation encouraging players to push forward and join the attack, teams can leave themselves short of numbers when it comes to slowing or stopping opposing counter-attacks. Opponents can then progress further following a transition, meaning bigger and more frequent recovery runs back into shape. This increases the physical demands on the players.

A lone centre-forward can be isolated in attack if they lack support from the wide attackers or advanced midfielders, and as such can find themselves numerically underloaded against opposition centre-backs. This can also mean too little attacking presence in the penalty area if teammates fail to make supporting runs.